

SPEECH

OF

HON. LEWIS CASS, OF MICHIGAN,

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 3, 1848.

On the Bill reported from the Committee on Military Affairs to raise, for a limited time, an additional Military Force.

Mr. CASS said:

Mr. PRESIDENT: This is the first of a series of bills, which the Military Committee is about to present to the Senate. They have commenced with the most important, and will ask the consideration of the others, in succession, till they have discharged the duty intrusted to them.

In presenting this bill, I do not propose to touch any of the disputed topics, which divide the two great parties, under the banner of one or the other of which, every citizen of our country is arrayed. I shall leave these, if introduced at all, to be introduced by others. I had hoped, till I heard the incidental discussion, which arose a day or two since, on the question of taking up this bill, that these exciting subjects would be postponed for some future opportunity, and that the propositions now submitted would be considered upon their military merits, taking it for granted, that the propriety of voting the additional force required, would not be controverted. I was well aware, that we could not escape a full discussion of the origin of the war, its progress, its objects, and the whole course of the Administration, connected with it. Nor indeed did I wish to avoid it. However severe may be the attack, I trust it will be as earnestly met, and easily repelled, for I consider the ground, which the Administration occupies as perfectly impregnable. I am apprehensive, however, from the remarks, which fell from some of the honorable Senators the other day, that the whole field of controversy is to be gone over, and that we are to fight this bill, necessary, as I deem its immediate passage to the public interests, inch by inch, till all the great party questions of the day are debated and exhausted. If it is to be so, I must of course submit; but the fault shall not be mine, nor will I provoke the contest by introducing any topics, which may properly lead to it.

There is one point, sir, where we all can meet, and that is the gallantry and good conduct of our army. This is one of the high places, to which we can come up together, and, laying aside our party dissensions, mingle our congratulations that our country has had such sons to go forth to battle, and that they have gathered such a harvest of renown in distant fields.

The time has been—and there are those upon this floor who remember it well—when our national flag was said to be but striped bunting, and our armed vessels but fir-built frigates. The feats of our army and navy during our last war with England redeemed us from this reproach, the offspring of foreign jealousy; and had they not, the events of the present war would have changed these epithets into terms of honor; for our flag has become a victorious standard, borne by marching columns, over the hills and valleys, and through the cities, and towns, and fields of a powerful nation, in a career of success, of which few examples can be found in ancient or in modern warfare.

The movement of our army from Puebla was one of the most romantic and remarkable events, which ever occurred in the military annals of any country.

Our troops did not indeed burn their fleet, like the first conquerors of Mexico, for they needed not to gather courage from despair, nor to stimulate their resolution, by destroying all hopes of escape. But they voluntarily cut off all means of communication with their own country, by throwing themselves among the armed thousands of another, and advancing with stout hearts, but feeble numbers, into the midst of a hostile territory. The uncertainty which rested on the public mind, and the anxiety everywhere felt, when our gallant little army disappeared from our view, will not be forgotten during the present generation. There was a universal pause of expectation—hoping, but still fearing; and the eyes of twenty millions of people were anxiously fixed upon another country, which a little band of its armed citizens had invaded. A veil concealed them from our view. They were lost to us for fifty days, for that period elapsed, from the time when we heard of their departure from Puebla, till accounts reached us of the issue of the movement. The shroud which enveloped them then gave way, and we discovered our glorious flag, waving in the breezes of the capital, and the city itself invested by our army.

And similar circumstances marked the very commencement of the war, when the Mexicans first surrounded our troops, and shut them out from all communication with their country. This unexpected attack struck us all with astonishment, and we feared, as well we might, that numbers would overcome discipline and valor, which, however they might prolong, could not be expected to succeed in, the contest. And hopeless indeed might have been the result, had not the honored soldier, who commanded our troops, had confidence in them, and they in him—had he not known how to lead, and they to follow. And well and bravely did they all bear themselves in the critical circumstances, which surrounded them; and our doubts soon gave way to certainty, and gloomy forebodings to glorious convictions. And the campaign thus commenced was vigorously followed up on the Rio Grande, and victory after victory, till the crowning triumph at Buena Vista, was heralded by every breeze, and became familiar to our ears as household words.

During the whole of this war, there has been a series of successes, which has been uninterrupted by a single serious disaster. I hold in my hand a table, prepared at the Adjutant General's Office, from the best materials, which can be found there, exhibiting the actions fought with the enemy, and the forces engaged, and the losses sustained by each party. As we have official data, the true losses on our side are stated; but those on the side of the Mexicans are in some instances entirely omitted, and in others conjecturally estimated. This table shows the whole truth, so far as we are concerned, and but a part of the truth, so far as the enemy is concerned. Still, even under these circumstances, it is one of the proudest trophies, with which any army ever enriched its country.*

The Adjutant General remarks, that he cannot vouch for the perfect accuracy of the above statements, as from their nature they must often be estimated. He adds, that the above table, although essentially correct, is not entirely complete, for he thinks there are yet wanting some reports, &c., of affairs, which have been lost or intercepted, and it may be, that the above statement may hereafter need amendment or correction.

If we recorded our history upon stone, as was done in the primitive ages of the world, we should engrave this series of glorious deeds upon tables of marble. But we shall do better; we shall engrave it upon our hearts, and we shall commit it to the custody of the press, whose monuments, frail and feeble as they appear, yet from their wonderful power of multiplication, are more endu-

* See Table on page 8.

ring than brass or marble, than statues or pyramids, or the proudest monuments, erected by human hands.

Let it be remembered, sir, that these battles were fought in a great measure by new and undisciplined troops, hastily collected at home, and rapidly marched to the seat of warfare; by men who had abandoned the duties and comforts of domestic life, and who made war, not a trade as in Europe, but a temporary employment, in order to defend the interest and honor of their country. And even the small regular army, which existed at the commencement of the war, had seen little actual service in the field, and that not with a civilized foe, but in murderous conflicts with Indian tribes, where there was much exposure to meet, and little glory to gain. Many of the officers and soldiers, and indeed a great majority of them, and some of the commanders too, saw the first hostile gun fired in the very field, which they illustrated by their deeds, and moistened with their blood. Honor, then, to the highest and the lowest, to the greatest and the least. Honor to the living and the dead; to those who survive to enjoy it, and to the memory of those who sleep in a soldier's grave, far from the land they loved so well.

And, happy am I to see upon this floor, at this moment particularly, one of the gallant officers, who have inscribed their names high upon the military roll of their country; and there are others like him, in this city, who have returned from the campaign, in which they distinguished themselves, bearing upon their persons ineffaceable marks of courage and patriotism. A kind Providence has permitted them to come back, and the plaudit of grateful millions, *Well done, good and faithful servants*, is the proud welcome which greets them.

Let modern philanthropists talk as they please, the instincts of nature are truer than the doctrines they preach. Military renown is one of the great elements of national strength, as it is one of the proudest sources of gratification to every man, who loves his country, and desires to see her occupy a distinguished position among the nations of the earth.

I should have been proud to have been in Europe during our military operations in Mexico—proud to witness the effect of the skill and prowess of our army upon the statesmen and politicians and communities of the Old World. During the course of these events, there was no war there to attract the general attention, and to excite, by its uncertainties and vicissitudes, the solicitude of the governments. Our war was the event of the day, and many a steadfast gaze was cast across the Atlantic, to watch the prospects and progress of the pattern Republic, as we are invidiously termed, in the new career into which we had entered. As we all know, our institutions have friends and foes in the other hemisphere. To both, they are a light shining across the ocean, but inviting some, and warning others, as the impressions our experiment has produced have been favorable or unfavorable.

The anti-republican croakers of the Old World, at the commencement of our Government, predicted, that it could not long resist the shocks of peace or war. When they found it could do both, and do it successfully, they then denied our power to carry on a war without our own boundaries, should circumstances require such an exertion of national strength. This was our first great trial; for in the invasion of Canada, during the last war, the operations were so near, that they did not test our strength for distant warfare. The trial has been made, and has succeeded. No one will hereafter call in question our capacity to assert our rights, wherever these may require our interference. If the great experiment had failed, it would have taken ages to recover from the misfortune. But now, wherever the American flag is borne, or the name of American known, and that wherever, is everywhere, the glorious feats of this war have

proclaimed our power, and have announced, that we have taken our position side by side with the mightiest nations of the world. Hereafter, in the wildest dreams of ambition, there will be no dream of conquering us; nor will any hostile foot pollute our shore, but to escape from it, if it can, as best it may.

The present bill provides for raising ten additional regiments of infantry, to serve during the war. The average number of each regiment in the field, is rather less than three-fourths of the legal establishment; so that this measure, if adopted, will add about seven thousand five hundred men to the army. The organization is precisely that provided in the act, which passed at the last session of Congress for raising an additional force; and as the details were then fully considered, and are well known to the Senate, I need not recapitulate them here.

The reasons, which render this increase of force necessary, are so clearly and forcibly stated in the report of the Secretary of War, that I need do little more than request, that that portion of the document may be read.

The following extract from the report of the Secretary of War, was then read by the Secretary:

"Our career of success, so disastrous to Mexico; our conquest of so many of her States and territories; the subjugation and occupation of her capital; the defeat and dispersion of her armies; the capture of most of her *matériel* of war, and the annihilation of her former commerce, have not yet brought peace, or the offer of such terms as could be accepted by the United States without national degradation. The war still continues; and it is proper to present some suggestions in regard to its further prosecution. In making these suggestions, I pass, without remark, the proposition that we should abandon all our acquisitions, and withdraw our troops from the enemy's country. Such a proposition could only be seriously entertained if we were in reality the vanquished party, and were convinced of our inability to prolong the contest with reasonable hopes of success.

"Our further operations must, in my opinion, be conducted in one of the three following modes: *first*, to take and hold an indemnity line, to recede from all places and positions now occupied in advance of it, and cease from all aggressive operations beyond that line; *second*, to overrun the whole country, and hold all the principal places in it by permanent garrisons; and, *third*, to retain what we now possess, open the lines of communication into the interior, and extend our operations to other important places, as our means and the prospect of advantages shall indicate—keeping a disposable force always ready, within approachable limits, to annoy the enemy, to seize supplies, enforce contributions, and frustrate his efforts to collect means and assemble troops for the purpose of protracting the war.

"A full discussion of the comparative merits of these modes of conducting our military operations would extend this communication to an unwarrantable length; I shall, therefore, confine my remarks to a few prominent considerations relative to each.

"With reference to a speedy peace, with proper indemnity and security—the only object of the war—the line policy is regarded as objectionable. If our present position cannot command acceptable terms of pacification from Mexico, retiring to an indemnity line would certainly fail to produce such a result; it would weaken the inducements of the enemy to put an end to hostilities. Restored, by our voluntary surrender, to the possession of his capital and important departments, and relieved from the pressure of our arms, and from all apprehensions of further conquest and annoyance, beyond the limits we might select, he would be left with more abundant resources than he now possesses to prepare, at leisure and in security, to strike an effective blow with concentrated forces at our detached posts. To hold these posts safely, to retain possession of the seaports we now have, (if that should fall within the policy,) and to prevent incursions into the territories which we might choose to appropriate to ourselves, would, in my opinion, require a force as large as would suffice to maintain what we now occupy, and to carry our operations still further in the interior of the enemy's country, and make him feel the calamities of war in a way best calculated to induce him to seek for peace. But if in this I am mistaken, and the line policy should enable us to reduce the number of our troops, still, it will not, as I conceive, thereby effect a reduction of our actual expenditures for the war.

"In consequence of the interruption of intercourse between the seaports in our possession and the central parts of Mexico, the collections on imports have hitherto been inconsiderable. If the line policy is adopted, this intercourse will continue to be interrupted, and, consequently, the receipts of revenue from this source will be small.

"Under the operation of the line policy, all expectations of lessening the burden of sustaining our troops, by deriving supplies and contributions from the enemy, would be disappointed. The supplies in the vicinity of our posts would be withdrawn from our reach, as soon as our design to seize and appropriate them was ascertained or suspected. But, were it otherwise, as our posts would be remote from the wealth and resources of the country, the amount which could be obtained would be inconsiderable.

"So far from deriving advantage from the line policy, by way of obtaining assistance from the resources of the enemy, towards the support of our troops, we should, I apprehend, confer upon a portion of the people of Mexico a direct benefit, by opening to them at our posts a market,

in which we should become the purchasers of their products at an exorbitant price. These considerations, without bringing into view others, have led me to look to one of the other modes of operation I have mentioned, as preferable to that of occupying an indemnity line.

"In regard to the second mode suggested—that of occupying the whole country—the wide extent of territory embraced in the Mexican Republic, the many important points to be garrisoned, and the long lines of communication to be kept open, present difficulties of no ordinary magnitude, if our occupancy is to be of such a character as to supersede the Mexican authority, and require the temporary establishment of civil government. In carrying this plan into effect, it would not be reasonable to rely upon the favorable disposition, or even neutrality, of any considerable part of the Mexican people, until some assurance of the stability of our power was derived from its continuance. Our posts must therefore be strong, and our forces numerous, in order to secure the many and long lines of communication, to disperse and chastise the guerrilla bands which would obstruct them, and to suppress the more powerful aspirings of the people wherever they may be attempted. I cannot safely estimate the force requisite to carry into full effect this plan, at less than seventy thousand men. To ensure the presence of that number in the enemy's country, and at places where they would be wanted, it would be necessary to raise a much larger force. The great expense of raising, organizing, and sending to their remote destination so large a body of troops as soon as needed, to give effect to this plan, would, I apprehend, bring a very heavy, and perhaps embarrassing, demand upon the treasury.

"The third mode presented is, in my judgment, preferable to the others. Beyond certain limits, it admits of expansion and contraction; but, as a fixed condition, all now held is to be retained, and no part surrendered, but in compliance with treaty stipulations. This plan also contemplates further acquisitions extending to other important points, more or less numerous, as circumstances may warrant.

"Notwithstanding our victories have fallen with crushing weight upon the assembled armies of Mexico, most of those who hold in their hands the decision of the question of peace, have stood beyond the range of the physical evils inflicted by the war. By extending the theatre of it, and changing the mode of conducting it, they can be made to feel its pressure. In consequence of our liberal and humane policy, we have, as yet, scarcely touched the substance of the wealthy and influential classes in Mexico. As the Mexican army has long been to them the instrument of oppression in the hands of their successive rulers, its destruction has not deeply enlisted their sympathies, or alarmed their fears. Our army has afforded them better protection than their own; and thus, by our presence and our forbearance, they have, within certain limits, hitherto escaped exactions from either. But our successes have now opened the way to act upon and influence those who probably can, if they will, put an end to hostilities. By making them suffer the usual calamities of war, they must be made to desire peace.

"In addition to the troops required to garrison places to be retained, it is proposed to have in the field a competent force for aggressive operations; to strike the enemy whenever he may present a vulnerable point; to open avenues from the ports in our possession into the enemy's country; and to cover and to subject to our control some of his rich mining districts and productive agricultural regions. It is not deemed proper to point out in more detail the movements and objects contemplated in the further prosecution of the war upon this plan."

Assuming that this plan of operations recommended by the Secretary of War is the true one, (and, for myself, I have no doubt upon that subject,) we have then four great objects to be kept in view, in estimating the force to be provided for the future conduct of the war:

1. The continued occupation of the important positions, we now hold.
2. The taking possession of such other commanding points, as experience may show to be proper, and as the circumstances of the war may require.
3. The preservation of the necessary communication between our positions, as well from the sea-coast to the capital, as in other portions of the country, which may be brought into subjection to us.
4. A strong force, independent of what is necessary for these purposes, which shall always be kept upon the alert, and ready to move, whenever there may be any appearance of an outbreak on the part of the Mexican people.

The organization and maintenance of a large force may be the means of rendering its employment unnecessary. It is much better to render opposition hopeless, by the display of strength, than to excite it into action, by the exhibition of weakness, and then to be compelled to resort to desperate struggles, to remedy evils, which ordinary prudence would have prevented. It is true humanity also, and we owe it to ourselves, to our army, who have done and suffered so much, to the enemy, and to the world. Remember, sir, that our troops are three thousand miles from home, in the midst of a hostile population of eight or ten millions, and that, by great exertions and unparalleled bravery,

they have succeeded in a partial subjugation of the country. But we have no right again to expose them to such perils. There is a vast superiority of physical force opposed to them. All experience shows, that in this condition an invaded people will suddenly break out into insurrections, and sometimes display an energy and courage, which they failed to exhibit upon the battle-field. Who would weigh with a critical balance the amount of opposition we have to apprehend, and the strength necessary to overcome it, and then coolly provide this calculated force, and leave events to take care of themselves? What kind of political arithmetic would that be, which would say, if so many troops have done so much, how many will it require to do so much more? I trust, that the supplies we may vote, will be given upon a far better principle: upon a principle, which shall look, indeed, to results, but which shall make the most liberal arrangements for attaining them.

The proceedings of this Government are as well known in Mexico as here. They do not indeed travel upon the wings of the wind, but they travel with the power of the press, and are spread through the civilized world. Vigorous and prompt action will produce the happiest effect upon the state of things in Mexico. Nothing would conduce more to impress upon the people of that country the necessity of a peace, than a unanimous determination in Congress to put forth all the strength of the nation till it is obtained.

I have caused the following abstract to be prepared from the report of the Adjutant General, exhibiting the entire strength of our present army, including regulars and volunteers:

Volunteers—actual force, about.....	20,000	
To complete the organization will require.....	12,500	
Twenty-five regiments of regulars—full legal complement, exclusive of officers....	28,814	
Actual strength.....		21,533
To complete the organization will require.....	7,281	
During the last year, there were recruited—		
For the old army.....	11,018	
For the new army.....	11,162	
Forces in the field under General Scott—		
Regulars.....	17,101	
Volunteers.....	15,055	
Aggregate.....	<u>32,156</u>	32,156
Deduct the garrisons of Tampico and Vera Cruz.....	-	1,947
Makes, for all the operations between Vera Cruz and Mexico, including garrisons, together with the sick and disabled.....	-	30,209
The returns in the Adjutant General's Office do not show the actual distribution of this force.		
Under General Taylor, but temporarily commanded by General Wool—		
Regulars.....	3,937	
Volunteers.....	2,790	
Aggregate.....	<u>6,727</u>	6,727
Under General Price, in New Mexico—		
Regulars.....	255	
Volunteers.....	2,902	
Aggregate.....	<u>3,157</u>	3,157
On the Oregon route, under Lieutenant Colonel Powell, Fort Kearny—		
Volunteers.....	-	477
In California, under Colonel Mason—		
Regulars.....	216	
Volunteers.....	803	
Aggregate.....	<u>1,019</u>	1,019
Total land force employed in the prosecution of the war:		
Regulars.....	21,509	
Volunteers.....	22,027	
Aggregate.....	<u>43,536</u>	

It will be seen, that we have in Mexico, under General Scott, besides the garrisons of Tampico and Vera Cruz, about 29,000 men, rank and file, excluding officers; and in the command of General Taylor, an aggregate of 6,727 men, officers included.

From the statements of the Adjutant General, it appears that the actual force kept up is less, by one-fourth, than the legal force authorized by law. The continually renewing casualties of war, and other circumstances, occasion this difference. And it is not probable, that the existing legal establishment could, by any effort, be made to keep in the field a greater numerical strength, than is now there. So that if the force of the army is to be materially augmented, this must be done by the creation of new corps, and by multiplying the arrangements for procuring recruits and volunteers. I have omitted in this enumeration, some bodies of volunteers, which have been called out, but have not yet joined the army. They cannot, if full, which it is not probable they will be, exceed 2,200 men, and do not change the question before us: if, indeed, they do more than keep up for a time the present number of volunteers in the field.

I know nothing more of the proposed plan of the campaign, than is disclosed in that part of the report of the Secretary of War, which has just been read to the Senate. I do not therefore presume to speak authoritatively upon the subject, and indeed it may well be, that no fixed system of operations has been or will be prescribed by the Executive; but that after expressing its general views, the conduct of the war will be left to the discretion of the commander. But it is easy to see, that if the obstinate injustice of the Mexicans drives us to greater exertions, and to a more enlarged sphere of operations, there are a number of positions which, from their importance, military or political, we must seize and hold. These can only be indicated by an exact knowledge of the country, and particularly of its great lines of communication, which must be commanded and guarded.

And the mining countries would claim their share of attention, in the efforts we may be called on to make. The rich districts of Zacatecas and San Luis yet contribute their supplies to the reduced treasury of the enemy. I have seen within a few days a letter from one of the most gallant and distinguished generals in Mexico, which estimates the revenue now derived from the mines at an amount so much higher than I was prepared to expect, that I am unwilling to state it here, as I am not at liberty to name my authority. But if this information is correct, or near it, the product is a most important portion of the national resources, which should be diverted from the Mexican treasury to ours. And he also gives it as his decided opinion, that by proper arrangement and exertions, the produce of the taxes of the country may be made to bear the expenses of holding it in our possession. If so, and the same infatuation continues to prevail in the Mexican councils, we can hold on, as indeed we must hold on, and let the enemy pay the cost of a state of things, whose existence is owing to themselves. Without the extinction of their independence, and the annexation of such a vast population to our country, with few sympathies to unite them to us, we can continue to govern them, and govern them with energy and justice, such as are new in their history, till the lessons of adversity shall have taught them to do us right, and till the experience of our sway and its operation around them, shall have brought them to a better state of feeling. We can then treat with efficient rulers, and after securing the just objects of the war, we can retire, leaving the Mexican people in the enjoyment of their independence, with a salutary conviction, that it is better to secure our friendship by justice, than to provoke our enmity by insults and aggressions.

The returns show that we have less than 20,000 men, rank and file, which

excludes officers, in the midst of a hostile population, of eight or ten millions, differing from us in race, in language, in religion, in institutions, in prejudices, and indeed in all the characteristics, which constitute national identity, and separate the great families of mankind from one another. This is exclusive of our force upon the Rio Grande, amounting to about 6,000 rank and file, and which is hardly large enough to hold that region in peaceable possession, and to guard against the irruption of the Mexican troops. And it may be that this force will need augmentation with a view to onward operations, either directly upon San Luis, or by the more circuitous but less difficult route of Zacatecas to the central countries of Northern Mexico.

He who believes that this principal force of 28,000 men, and this auxiliary force of 6,000, including the sick, invalids and disabled, are amply sufficient to hold in subjection the people already reduced to obedience, to carry the war further the longer it is protracted, and to meet its casualties, whether these are found in the battle-field, in the climate, or in popular tumults, may well vote against this bill, and refuse the augmentation it provides. But those, who, like me, believe that this Government, founded by all for the good of all, is bound by the most sacred obligations not to expose its citizens to unnecessary peril, nor to push their exertions to the very limit of human endurance, but to make the most liberal arrangements for the prosecution of the war, and to hold the treasure of the nation light as dust, when weighed in the balance with the life-blood of its sons, will cheerfully vote for this proposition, and hail its passage not only as a necessary measure of policy, but as a tribute to gallantry and patriotism.

TABLE referred to on second page.

Affair or battle.	Date.	Forces engaged.		Number of killed.			Number of wounded.		
		Americans, regulars & volunteers.	Mexicans.	Americans, regulars & volunteers.	Mexicans.	Americans, regulars & volunteers.	Mexicans.		
1. Detachment under Captain Thornton, 2d dragoons, in a reconnaissance on the Rio Grande, above Fort Brown, Texas.....	April 25, 1846.....	63	200	10	unknown.	6	unknown.		
2. Detachment of Captain Walker's Texas Rangers, near Point Isabel, Texas.....	April 28.....	30	100	10	unknown.	-	unknown.		
3. Fort Brown.....	May 4 to May 9...	750	4,000	2	unknown.	10	unknown.		
4. Palo Alto.....	May 8.....	2,300	6,500	4	100	42	300		
5. Resaca de la Palma.....	May 9.....	1,700	6,500	36	200	92	400		
6. Monterey.....	Sept. 21, 22, 23.....	6,645	10,000	120	700	368	unknown.		
7. San Pasqual, Upper California.....	Dec. 6.....	110	160	19	unknown.	15	unknown.		
8. Brazito, New Mexico.....	Dec. 25.....	500	1,220	-	*200	-	-		
9. Los Angeles, California.....	Jan. 8, 9, 1847.....	500	600	1	*50	14	6		
10. La Canada, New Mexico.....	Jan. 24.....	350	1,500	9	36	6	3		
11. Mora, New Mexico.....	Jan. 24.....	-	-	1	-	-	-		
12. El Embudo.....	Jan. 29.....	500	700	-	20	1	80		
13. Puebla de Taos.....	Feb. 4.....	200	800	6	150	46	-		
14. Buena Vista.....	Feb. 22, 23.....	4,759	20,000	267	*1,500	408	-		
15. Sacramento.....	Feb. 28.....	90	4,000	-	*600	*5	-		
16. Vera Cruz.....	March 11 to 29.....	11,000	5,500	12	*500	51	-		
17. Cerro Gordo.....	April 18.....	8,500	12,000	87	*1,200	353	-		
18. Calaboso, California, De Russy.....	July 12.....	126	1,500	15	200	13	-		
19. Contreras.....	} Aug. 19, 20.....	8,497	32,000	164	*4,000	865	-		
20. San Antonio.....									
21. Churubusco.....	} Aug. 10 to 19.....	1,200	2,000	9	unknown.	74	unknown.		
22. On Major Lally's march.....									
23. Molino del Rey.....	Sept. 8.....	3,251	14,000	201	*3,000	581	-		
24. Chapultepec.....	Sept. 11, 12, 13.....	7,189	25,000	178	unknown.	673	unknown.		
25. Attack on Puebla.....	Sept. 13 to Oct. 12.....	1,409	8,000	18	unknown.	53	unknown.		
26. Huamantla.....	Oct. 9.....	1,780	4,000	14	161	11	300		
27. General Lane, Puebla.....	Oct. 12.....	3,100	4,000	-	-	-	a few.		
28. Atisco.....	Oct. 19.....	1,500	2,000	1	219	2	300		
Total.....	1,077	12,865	3,669	1,360		

* Killed and wounded.